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“This intuitive sense of 
self is an effortless and 
fundamental experience.  
But it is nothing more 
than an elaborate 
illusion”, p 33, New 
Scientist, Feb 2013  The prevailing view about the Self held by many different types of academics: “You” don’t exist 
Many neuroscientists currently claim that there is no such ‘thing’ as the self.  For example, Bruce Hood, 
neuroscientist and experimental psychologist, in his recent highly acclaimed book, The Self Illusion (2012) 
writes, p viii “We see ourself in a mirror.  This is who we are… yet brain science shows that this sense of our 
self is an illusion.  We all certainly experience some form of self but what we experience is a powerful 
deception generated by our brains for our own benefit.” 
 
Many analytical philosophers of mind also agree with this idea that the self does not exist, for example, 
Derek Parfit.  Parfit argues that “We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies … 
Our existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies.” p 194, Parfit (1984).   
 
Many scientists eschew the idea of the self too.  For example, Peter Atkins in his recent book On Being 
(2011) states clearly, p 89 “The brain is the centre of the production of the sense of self, of the conscious 
determination to survive, and great acts of creativity, all of which components we term, for ease of discourse, 
the ‘human spirit’.  But that is all it is:  the ‘human spirit’ is a portmanteau word for that package of intentions 
and achievements: there is no substance beyond the verbal packaging”. 
 
 
The purpose of this presentation is two-fold: 
i/ to assert that the view that the self is an illusion or does not exist, expressed in sections  
1 and 2, is wrong and  
ii/ to recommend instead an ontological account of human beings which postulates a new 
form of (Non-Cartesian) Substance Dualism and provides the answer YES to the 
questions: Do you exist? And can you act by thinking?   
This new form of Substance Dualism is a Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism; it is a Self-
Body Dualism, defended by E J Lowe (1996, 2006, 2008).  
For a recent interview with EJ Lowe on his metaphysical views and how they fit with science – 
see www.3ammagazine.com/3am/metaphysical-foundations-for-science/ 
 
Some background first:  Why are the views expressed in sections 2 and 3 expressed in such a 
confident manner and by such eminent individuals?  The reason I think is because they reflect a world 
view which many traditional scientists and philosophers wish to adopt: Physicalism.  Roughly, this is 
the view that everything that there is, is physical, or can be reduced to the physical.  Physics is widely 
regarded as the “most successful science” as far as giving us knowledge about the world.  But how do 
mental states such as thoughts and desires - how can they fit into the physical world? It used to be 
thought that mental states literally were just physical (=brain) states, however, this was soon 
concluded to be an untenable theory (because if you see a squid in pain, and you see a person in 
pain, you imagine that they must have something of the same sort of qualitative experience, and yet 
their brain physiology is different, therefore mental state `  brain state).  However, now the “name of the 
game” for most philosophers of mind, is to try to work out how mental states either supervene on or 
are multiply realized by brain states. (Supervenience and Multiple Realization are philosophical terms, 
but basically they refer, in this context, to the nature of relationship between mental states and brain 
states).  Most of them want to come up with an account where the upshot is that all that exists in the 
world is physical stuff, because this will be a straightforwardly scientific account, which will seem like 
the right answer. 
4. 
Why this obsession with the physical?  Well, since the time of René Descartes, 
there has been a quest to come up with a theory that meets the objections that are 
levied against Mind-Body Dualism.  Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism is the view that 
the Mind is an immaterial thing and the Body is a distinct material thing.  This view, 
albeit one that is often implicitly adopted by many psychologists (carrying with it the 
belief that minds are real entities, distinct from bodies) is one that is rejected by most 
contemporary philosophers and scientists.   Descartes’ claim that the mind is 
immaterial and body material, makes a mystery out of mind-body interaction: how 
can something that is not wholly immaterial have an impact on something which is 
wholly material?  Many people have presented objections to the Cartesian view, but 
perhaps most famous of all is Gilbert Ryle (1949) in his publication of The Concept 
of Mind when he introduced the phrase “ ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’” 
(p 13).  Ryle categorically rejected Descartes’ theory of the relation between mind 
and body and there are few who would defend a Cartesian dualist theory nowadays.  
Instead as I have indicated in section 4, there is an almighty effort to come up with a 
way which means that Physicalism explains everything in the natural world.  
However we are still left with the problem of mental causation, the intuitive notion 
that if I think I will do something, that this thinking plays a causal role in action. 
5. 
I think they are 
wrong and he is 
right 
E J Lowe’s Self-Body Dualism is an ontological theory which I claim, but do not comprehensively argue for here (as my goal is to present the view, as a 
viable alternative to other doctrines) which provides the best theoretical account of the human beings, well equipped to deal with the problem of mental 
causation.  On EJ Lowe’s account, selves are substances in their own right.  They have independent causal powers.  A self is a bearer of both 
mental and physical states and it plays a crucial role in mental causation, which I detail in sections 7 and 8 below.  (For more information on his account, 
see his Subjects of Experience and Personal Agency.  For my defense of his view, see http://glasgow.academia.edu/RenéeBleau/) 
 
6. 
Lowe’s straight-forward argument for the truth of his Self-Body Substance Dualism which is 
deductively valid (which means, to use the philosophical jargon, that if the premises are true, 
then the conclusion must be true). 
 
Premise 1: I am the subject of all and only my own mental states 
Premise 2: Neither my body as a whole nor any part of it (such as my brain) could be 
the subject of all and only my own mental states. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Conclusion: I am not identical with my body or any part of it.  That is, I am an entity 
which is distinct from my body, which is another entity. 
7. 
Utilizing these two distinct entities, a self, which is a non-physical entity, and a 
body (which has a brain as one of its parts), Lowe’s theory postulates 
radically different causal profiles for each entity in mental causation.  Take 
as an example when I wave with my arm.  There is the mental decision to wave 
with my arm (attributed to the self – depicted as “I” below) and the bodily action 
of arm-waving (obviously involving neural events and other bodily events – 
depicted by the brain below).  What is involved in the case of arm-waving?  On 
Lowe’s account it looks like this (using Barak Obama as the example ‘subject’): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
9. 
If this account by Lowe strikes you as being consistent with 
common sense – that is, the claim being made by E J Lowe that 
we are something over and above our bodies and brains - then 
that is all to the good.  He writes in his seminal book Subjects of 
Experience p ix “I defend a substantival theory of the self as an 
enduring and irreducible entity, essentially a self-conscious 
subject of thought and experience and source of intentional 
action”.   
Why does this matter for psychologists? 
Well if Lowe is right, then the idea that neuroscience will 
eventually explain everything about us because we simply “are” 
our brains, is wrong.  And psychologists will have a crucial and 
separate role to play in making sense of the self, an entity which 
Lowe claims is a psychological (non-physical) substance. 
Thanks go to Dr Tom Mcclelland for permission to use this Waving Obama from his Philosophy 
of Mind PowerPoint slides from Sem 2 of 2012-13 at the University of Glasgow, and also for his 
helpful answers and suggestions to my questions in preparing this Poster. 
Thanks are also due to Professor Fraser MacBride, Dr Frederique Janssen-lauret and Dr Chris 
Lindsay for their comments and feedback on the text. 
“I” 
IE:  Do “you” exist? And can “you” act by thinking? 
3. 
2. 
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The philosophical doctrine relied on 
here is known as the Indiscernibility 
of Identicals (Leibniz), formally: 
 
 
That is: if selves and bodies do not 
have exactly the same properties, 
then they cannot be identical. 
